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The enormous impact of offshore accounts and bank secrecy 
on developing countries raises a critical question: Do states like 
Switzerland, which provide a tax haven for wealthy citizens of 
developing countries, violate internationally recognized human rights?   
The implementation of FATCA has begun to end bank secrecy 
and to require automatic information reporting of income earned by 
U.S. citizens in offshore investment accounts.  Moreover, recent 
commitments by Austria, Luxembourg, and Switzerland mark a 
beginning to the end of bank secrecy in Europe and movement 
toward automatic information reporting of income earned by 
European citizens in offshore accounts in European countries. 1  In 
addition, in June the G-8 issued a call for world-wide automatic 
information reporting,2 and the OECD is expected to issue a similar 
call. 
Nevertheless, other than hortatory statements from the G-8 and 
probably the OECD, there is no concrete progress yet toward ending 
bank secrecy and instituting automatic information reporting for the 
offshore accounts of citizens from developing countries outside the 
U.S. and Europe.  Moreover, for the developing world, the tax gap 
created by offshore accounts is a much larger problem than for 
already developed, industrialized economies.  Only about 2% of 
North American private wealth and 8% of European wealth is 
                                      
1 Andrew Higgins, Europe Pushes to Shed Stigma of a Tax Haven, 
The New York Times, May 23, 2013, page 1. 
2  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/207543/180613_LOUGH_ERNE_DECLARATION.pdf 
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invested offshore, compared with more than 25% of Latin American 
and 33% of Middle Eastern and African private wealth.3  
What is the magnitude of the tax gap created for developing 
countries by offshore accounts?  Information about the income and 
assets in most offshore accounts is currently subject to laws that 
require confidentiality and make disclosure of such information a 
crime.  Thus, estimates of the tax gap caused by offshore accounts 
are difficult to produce and may be unreliable.  According to one 
estimate, tax revenues lost each year by offshore tax evasion, 
including offshore accounts, may approximate all official worldwide 
development assistance, on the order of $120 billion a year.4  More 
recent estimates by the Tax Justice Network suggest that the total 
offshore wealth held by citizens or residents of the developing world 
is two or three times more than previously thought and that the lost 
tax revenue may consequently be much greater.5  
What is certain is that the magnitude is growing.  According to 
the leading authority, Prof. Itai Grinberg, “The capacity to make, hold, 
                                      
3 BOS. CONSULTING GRP., GLOBAL WEALTH 2011: SHAPING A 
NEW TOMORROW 13 (2011) at 5, 7, 13 and n.3, available at 
http://www.bcg.com.pl/documents/file77766.pdf.  
 
4 Remarks of Jeffrey Owens, then-director of the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs, Meeting of the OECD’s Informal Task Force on Tax and 
Development (May 10-11, 2012).  OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, Investing in Development: A Common Cause in a 
Changing World, OECD 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/1/43854787.pdf. 
 
5 Available at 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?client=1&lang=1&par
ent=91&subid=91&idcat=103&idart=114 
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and manage investments through offshore financial institutions has 
increased dramatically in recent years, while the cost of such services 
has plummeted.  Individuals now find it substantially easier to 
underreport or fail to report investment earnings through the use of 
offshore accounts, and experience suggests that such accounts may 
also be used to help evade tax on income earned domestically by 
closely held businesses.  Consequently, the principal held in offshore 
accounts, as well as the investment earnings generated through such 
accounts, may go untaxed.”6  
Moreover, according to Prof. Grinberg, “In many [developing] 
economies, the bulk of the individual income tax base is often 
comprised of a concentrated group of well-off individuals.  Domestic 
financial institutions are also often relatively undeveloped.  [I]t is 
commonplace for the wealthy to hold investments through offshore 
accounts. . . . Thus, the taxation of offshore wealth should be of 
greater relative importance to Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Africa, than to the United States and Canada or the major European 
economies.”7  
No international human rights agreement mentions bank 
secrecy or tax evasion.  Moreover, no international tax treaty 
mentions human rights.  Nevertheless, bank secrecy has a significant 
human rights impact if governments of developing countries are 
deprived of resources needed to meet basic economic rights 
                                      
 
6 Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA 
Law Rev. 304, 308 (2012). 
 
7 Id., p. 309.  
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guaranteed by the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights.  The Covenant came into force in 1976 and 
currently has 160 member state parties.  Among states that are 
parties to the Treaty are even several notorious offshore account 
jurisdictions, including Switzerland and Luxembourg (but not 
Singapore).    
The Covenant explicitly recognizes individual rights to adequate 
food, clothing, and housing (Article 11); health care, clean water, and 
sanitation (Article 12); and education (Article 13).  The Covenant also 
imposes obligations on member states to implement these rights.  
Article 2 states:  
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps . . . , to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant . . . .” 
 The Covenant acknowledges constraints on government ability 
to meet these obligations due to limits of available resources but also 
imposes an obligation to progressively improve, that is, to take steps 
to realize the rights enumerated in the Covenant.  Thus, under the 
Covenant, states have the obligation of “progressive realization.” 
 One issue is whether obligations under the Covenant extend 
extraterritorially.  Do parties have an obligation to progressively 
improve the enumerated rights, not only in those territories over 
which they have jurisdiction, but also in territories over which they do 
not?  Although there is no explicit language restricting the obligations 
to a state’s own territory, one has the sense in reading the Covenant 
that extraterritorial obligations were not considered or intended.  
 5 
When referring generally to rights to food, clothing, health care, clean, 
water, sanitation, housing and education in Articles 11, 12, and 13, 
the Covenant appears to mean the obligations of a government with 
respect to individuals within its territorial jurisdiction.  Article 14 refers 
specifically to the obligation of a state to provide primary education 
“in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction 
[emphasis added]. . . .” 
 Nevertheless, at least one committee of legal experts, 
convened by Maastricht University and the International Commission 
of Jurists, interprets the Covenant to impose extraterritorial 
obligations.  In February 2012, this committee proposed the so-called 
“Maastricht Principles,” under which: 
“A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfill 
economic . . . rights recognized by the ESC Covenant in . . . 
situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable 
effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, 
whether within or outside its territory” and in “situations in which the 
State  . . . is in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take 
measures to realize economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.”8 
More specifically, Articles 19 and 20 of The Maastricht 
Principles call on states to “refrain from conduct which nullifies or 
impairs the enjoyment and exercise of economic . . . rights of persons 
                                      
8 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/2011/Maa
strichtEcoSoc.pdf. 
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outside their territories . . . or which impairs the ability of another 
State to comply with that State’s . . . obligations as regards economic 
rights.” 
There are two further possible objections to concluding that a 
state providing a tax haven for offshore accounts violates human 
rights recognized by the Covenant.  Even if the government of the 
account holder receives information about the offshore account, it 
may lack the capacity to collect the revenue that is legally owed.  
Even if the revenue is collected, there is no assurance that it will be 
used to progressively realize the rights recognized by the Covenant.  
Thus, there is no certainty of an actual connection between one 
country providing secrecy for investment accounts of the taxpayers of 
another country and the resulting failure of the second country to 
progressively realize Covenant rights. 
There are also varying degrees of state responsibility for the 
offshore accounts within its jurisdiction.  The degree of responsibility 
may depend on whether a state enacts bank secrecy laws 
criminalizing the disclosure of financial information to tax authorities, 
fails to apply a withholding tax on offshore accounts at a rate 
sufficient to deter their use for tax evasion, evades requests for 
information about offshore accounts from other governments 
conducting taxpayer investigations, or otherwise limits efforts to allow 
for more extensive automatic information exchange.  The 
responsibility is particularly great in the case of Switzerland, which 
manages 30% of all individual wealth held through offshore accounts, 
has a legal regime that has criminalized the disclosure of financial 
information, and has refused to withhold tax on offshore account 
 7 
income or provide financial information about offshore accounts, 
except when under enormous pressure from powerful governments, 
such as Germany, the UK, and the United States, or when it views 
agreeing to provide withholding to a given group of countries (weak 
EU states) as a mechanism to limit pressure to help other, often 
poorer (at least on a GDP/capita basis) states.   
No international mechanism exists for actually enforcing the 
Covenant, even when a clear violation is established.  Parties to the 
covenant are required to submit regular reports to a UN Committee 
on implementation and an optional protocol, not yet in force, would 
permit individuals to submit complaints of violations. 
Thus, it may not be crucial to definitively determine whether, as 
a technical matter, the maintenance of secrecy for offshore accounts 
constitutes a violation of internationally recognized human rights.  
Whether state obligations under the Covenant are extraterritorial, 
whether revenues owed would actually be collected, and, whether, if 
collected, revenues would be appropriately used is less important 
than recognizing the fact that secrecy for offshore accounts makes it 
difficult for developing countries to implement Covenant obligations.  
It therefore seems indisputable that offshore accounts impede the 
fulfillment of internationally recognized human rights.  Recognition of 
this fact could accelerate the growing international effort to curb bank 
secrecy for offshore accounts and establish a multilateral automatic 
information exchange system so that developing countries, as well as 
industrialized countries, benefit.  
